The autonomy of the political field. The resources of the Deputies of Diyarbakır (Turkey): 1920-2002

The increasing complexity of societies is reflected in the autonomy of social fields1. The closure of the field is defined notably through the existence of separate institutions: its ability to create norms and its own stakes2. However, though the make-up of fields has been described in numerous instances, the autonomy of a field – above all its fluctuations – is difficult to pinpoint from an empirical standpoint. In order to do this, here we consider the example of a political field and we centre our analysis on one of the dimensions of this autonomy: the question of resources mobilised by the actors. In the case of the political field – of interest to us here –the term resources applies to what an individual may mobilise, for instance in order to be elected: militancy, religious charisma, social capital, etc.3 One of the dimensions of the autonomy of a field stems from the mobilisation of resources outside of the field in question, through complex and costly procedures, forming a veritable process of transformation. In the same way, the capacity of actors (individuals, institutions) to produce their own resources (activism, ideological discourse, etc.) is an indicator of autonomy. The process of transforming resources therefore allows an appreciation of the varying autonomy arising from the level of transformation of resources and from the ability of political actors to create their own resources. In comparison, an approach taken from biographical traits (age, qualification, gender, profession, etc.) enabling a description of how the position of an actor leads to an expression of certain consistencies between the field or the multiple standpoints, but which leaves largely unexplored the question of what circulates (and what is transformed) from one field to another.

[2] In order to test these hypotheses, we examine the resources mobilised for the election of deputies in the republican period (1920-2002) for the administrative department (il) of Diyarbakır in South-Eastern Turkey4. Why favour an analysis on a departmental scale in this study? Firstly, this framework represents a consistent electoral constituency since the beginning of the Republic and therefore defines the principal field for electoral competition. Therefore, the value of resources can be appreciated much more easily in the context of a competition. The construction of resources at the national level a priori suggests a consistency of mobilised resources throughout all the administrative departments, a theory which this paper resolutely rejects.

[3] Secondly, research into resources does not allow for the direct use of existing sources because these only give a general indication of social position. Thus, the resources, which a posteriori give the greatest indication of the longevity of a deputy are not included in the official categories, often because they concern aspects considered to be private or illicit. Furthermore, the data collected nation-wide in year books - the biographies of the TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Large National Assembly of Turkey) for instance – are incomplete, if not sometimes incorrect, from where the necessity arises to fill in the gaps using other sources, including interviews or local history – a task most easily achieved in the context of an administrative department, especially over an extended period.

[4] We now present in more detail the administrative department we have selected. In its political behaviour (vote, partisan structure), the administrative department of Diyarbakır5 is not representative of such an average, but on the other hand is unique in many other aspects. Diyarbakır belongs to a group of regional departments whose population is largely Kurdish, and who have a specific political orientation. A study of the administrative department of Diyarbakır will enable us to look beyond certain stereotypes, sometimes orientalist, concerning the workings of local politics. In particular, tribal and brotherhood associations are explicitly or implicitly the basis of many political analyses, including local actors, who advocate a strong link between these solidarities and political behaviour. If, in effect, about 20 deputies out of the 163 elected between 1920 and 2002 belonged to a family of şeyh6, we will see that, mainly after 1980, their involvement in politics evokes more complex mechanisms than the simple mobilisation of their followers. Moreover, apart from the administrative department of Hakkari for example, no deputy has built up his electoral support essentially from a clan or tribal type group.

[5] The administrative department in fact is characterised by a growing politicisation – notably in the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when exactly the opposite was happening in the rest of Turkey. After 1980, the electoral results reflect the subtle differences as regards the national standard with the marginalisation of numerous national parties and the decisive grip of Kurdish parties7. The electoral volatility in Diyarbakır was less strong than in the rest of the country since the end of the 1980s, because the Kurdish movement was dominant with more than 45% of votes in 1995 and 1999, and 56% in 2002. As opposed to the rest of Turkey the elections of 2002 did not constitute a splits, la penetration of the AKP remained limited, and the extremely popular Genç Parti (Young Party), whose national level of penetration used to be a good indicator of political crisis, had a negligible result (Dorronsoro et al. 2003).

[6] Furthermore, the administrative department was not politically homogenous. The reasons for sub-departmental specificities are complex, and in part a consequence of the uprising in the 1920s and 1930s (Bruinessen 1999, Bozarslan 1997). Later on, the formation of radical Kurdish groups in the 1960s often occurred in the districts (ilçe) which were home to high school or institutions for higher education. Moreover, even if the dominant population of Kurds means that ethnic origin is not a deciding stake, the non-Kurdish population often have a specific political behaviour. The Turkish-speaking population present in the west of the administrative department (ilçe of Çermik), settling there from the 1960s as a result of dam construction, do not vote for Kurdist parties8, as is also the case for a significant number of members of the military, as well as civil servants with regional origins other than the south-east. The scenario is therefore very different to that in Urfa or Erzurum – administrative departments polarised by a religious or ethnic split. In the administrative department of Diyarbakır, the difference between speakers of zazaki and of kurmanji (two Kurdish dialects) do not constitute a framework for political mobilisation in recent times. A very large portion of the population being Chafeite Sunni, the religious split no longer plays a role.

[7] In choosing to consider the entire Republican period, we do not assume that there is similarity between elections from the single-party to the multiparty periods. On the other hand, the different institutional divides are of a key importance and provide the reason as to why the comparison between these four periods [1920-1946], [1950-1957], [1961-1977] and [1983-2002] is central to our examination into the autonomy of the political field. Only five deputies were elected in two different periods, demonstrating a renewal of practically the entire political personnel and likewise, the mobilised resources are noticeably different from one period to another. Whilst the name of a party such as the CHP can remain constant from one period to another, the political agenda and the organisational framework changes sufficiently for us to consider that the party is different. On the contrary, we suppose there is continuity in the Islamic (RF/FP) and Kurdish (DEP/HADEP/DEHAP) movements. We point out here that we do not consider the 1971 coup to be divisive. As opposed to the 1960 and 1980 coups, the 1971 coup did not result in as much of a visible split, possibly due to the fact that, allowing for exceptions, political parties were not prohibited.

[8] In order to analyse the resources employed in the political field during the election of deputies, we will undertake a four-stage process. Firstly, the different resources will be explained analytically, and we will see how their mobilisation makes re-election more or less likely. Secondly, by using social transformations taken from outside the political field (mechanisation of agriculture, urbanisation etc.), we will take into account the mobilisation, varying over time, of certain resources by those elected. These causal links have a genuine though incomplete explanatory value, which is why it is necessary to then turn towards explanations from within the political field. On one hand, the political parties play a central role in the transformation of non-political resources and in producing partisan resources. On the other hand, institutional splits – coups, the introduction of a multiparty system or the evolution of electoral laws – have a major impact on the resources enabling the election of deputies.

[9] The resources are valuable at two decisive moments in the political career of the future deputy: at the time the candidate is chosen by the party and during the mobilisation of voters (the same resource being effective principally towards the voters or the party, a point which we shall return to). We must however distinguish non-partisan resources from partisan resources. For Diyarbakır, four non-partisan resources were employed in politics: the influence arising through land ownership, religious charisma attributed to belonging to a şeyh family, the social capital linked with certain professions and the notoriety of an ‘aristocratic-like’ family (eşraf). The support of a political party – through activism, a special relationship with the leader, etc. – makes up the final resource which can be mobilised, mainly for the purposes of nomination of candidates. We do not claim to give a complete picture of all the resources – for instance, we could add oratorical ability or financial capital. Instead we present only a selection of the most significant resources for this particular area (see the annexe on methodology). More generally, the resources can be combined and evolve over time, especially for politicians who have long careers (Lacam 1998). After first giving an analytical presentation of these resources, we will then investigate their combination and their transformation.

[10] The practice of a rare and socially valued profession gives rise to the constitution of a social capital, which in turn can constitute a political resource. In our department, lawyers and doctors account for 35% of those elected following the introduction of a multiparty system in 1950 - out of 114 deputies 23 were lawyers (22%) and 17 doctors (13%) -, nevertheless only 20% (17 lawyers and 12 doctors) possess a social capital linked to their reputation (see the annexe on methodology). Between 1950 and 1977, 24 out of 61 deputies (39 %) were doctors or lawyers, a proportion, which clearly declined thereafter. Because they place individuals in a compromising situation, certain situations favour the self-referral to an expert - a form of delegation affecting sometimes very private matters. How does this particular social capital become a political resource? A central theme, present simultaneously for those in the professions as well as the profession of deputy, at least as far as defined by most citizens, is that of service (hizmet) – which facilitates the change to political representation. Furthermore, lawyers, through their professions, are drawn into representing prominent citizens, and significant groups, particularly against the State. The last point to be underlined is the prestige given to education in a society largely illiterate until the 1960s9.

Table 1: resources mobilised by the deputies for their election in the administrative department of Diyarbakır (1920-2002